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In 1929, residents of the Boys’ Industrial Home in Saint John, New Brunswick, 
engaged in a series of violent acts to protest the conditions they experienced in the 
institution and their sense of being unjustly treated. Those actions occurred at a 
serendipitous moment, as the Home was one among the collection of child welfare 
institutions under study by the Canadian Council on Child Welfare and its various 
agents. The Council was engaged in the project of liberal state formation and 
sought to extend across Canada similar standards for, and governance of, child 
welfare. While its project largely failed in New Brunswick, some transitions did 
occur at the Industrial Home, owing in part to the activism of the boys themselves.
En 1929, les jeunes internés au Boy’s Industrial Home à Saint John (Nouveau-
Brunswick) se sont livrés à une série d’actes de violence pour protester contre 
leurs conditions de vie dans cet établissement et le traitement injuste, à leurs 
yeux, qui leur était imposé. Ces gestes arrivaient au moment propice, puisque le 
foyer faisait partie du groupe d’établissements d’aide à l’enfance étudiés par le 
Conseil canadien pour la sauvegarde de l’enfance et ses divers agents. Dans la 
foulée du projet de formation d’un État libéral, le Conseil cherchait à appliquer 
d’un bout à l’autre du Canada des normes et une gouvernance semblables pour 
le bien-être des enfants. Si son projet a en grande partie échoué au Nouveau-
Brunswick, certains changements se sont cependant produits à l’Industrial Home, 
partiellement grâce au militantisme des enfants eux-mêmes.
POORHOUSE TOMMY was the son of an idle and intemperate father who had 
been arrested several times for drunkenness and beating Tom’s mother. The father 
deserted his family in 1920, leaving Tom’s mother unable to provide for her son 
and four daughters. By 1926, Tom’s mother was in the local almshouse with some 
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of the children, but Tom appears to have been entirely homeless. In the summer of 
that year, 11-years-old Poorhouse Tommy found himself sentenced to the Boys’ 
Industrial Home at Saint John for a period not to exceed five years. Tom had 
been found guilty of “being a neglected child under New Brunswick’s Children’s 
Protection Act.”1
To the class of modern, professionalized child welfare workers that emerged 
in the 1920s, the placement of an abandoned or neglected child like Tom into what 
was, for all intents and purposes, a juvenile jail was deeply problematic.2 Adoption 
or foster placements were the desired interventions for such children, and failing 
those, placement in an orphanage or children’s home was prescribed. Admittedly, 
some abandoned or neglected children in New Brunswick did receive the more 
desired interventions, but many others, seemingly at random, were deposited into 
one of an array of institutions, placed at a fresh air camp or hospital, given food 
or clothing aid by churches and volunteer organizations, or received no support 
at all. And some, like Tom, were cast as criminals simply in consequence of their 
own misfortune. 
Such random practices and inconsistencies in standards became the subject of 
intense scrutiny in New Brunswick in the late 1920s. In 1927, Charlotte Whitton 
and a newly emerging class of child welfare officials went to New Brunswick under 
the auspices of the Canadian Council on Child Welfare (CCWH or the Council), 
the organization that Whitton then directed. Under Whitton’s leadership, the 
Council eventually became the most important general child welfare organization 
in the country, leaving its footprints in all provinces by way of social surveys, 
commissioned studies, lectures, and reams of correspondence. Within its broad 
mandate, the Council pursued two tangible goals: the professionalization of social 
welfare staff and the deinstitutionalization of children—moving children out of 
social welfare institutions and into fostering arrangements. Upon these rested 
another layer of goals. Whitton sought to make the Council an unrivaled national 
organization, which would speak to Canada and for Canada about issues of child 
welfare. To facilitate this, in the course of survey activities Whitton ousted local 
child welfare workers and placed hand-picked, professionalized, and Council-
1 “Poorhouse Tommy” is the pseudonym given for case no. 454 in the Boys’ Industrial School History 
Book for 1929 and the nickname given to him by other boys at the Home. Provincial Archives of 
New Brunswick (hereafter PANB), New Brunswick Boys’ Industrial School (hereafter NBBIS), RS 
460-A-1-B, 1929, Boys Industrial School (hereafter BIS), History Book, 1929, case no. 454, p. 87. 
Under restrictions placed on the Boys’ Industrial Home records by the Young Offender’s Act (latterly the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act), the New Brunswick Archives Act, and the Office of the Attorney General 
of New Brunswick, no information that might reasonably identify a boy who was at the school may 
be presented. Where practical pseudonyms exist in the records, I use them. Access to the records was 
facilitated through application to the Office of the Attorney General of New Brunswick.
2 It was not unusual for children to be placed in any variety of institutions when families fell on hard times. 
Generally, however, an industrial school was viewed as an institution of last resort for those innocent of 
a crime, and placement there usually occurred only after other options had been exhausted. See Susan 
E. Houston, “The ‘Waifs and Strays’ of a Late Victorian City: Juvenile Delinquents in Toronto,” in Joy 
Parr, ed., Childhood and Family in Canadian History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), p. 140; 
and Diane L. Matters, “The Boys’ Industrial School: Education for Juvenile Offenders,” in J. D. Wilson 
and D. C. Jones, eds., Schooling and Society in Twentieth Century British Columbia (Calgary: Detselig 
Enterprises, 1980), p. 60.
3sympathetic personnel in social welfare organizations throughout the country, 
thereby stretching the influence of the Council across Canada. Whitton’s ultimate 
goal was to use these agents to help establish uniform standards of child and family 
welfare legislation and practice methods throughout the country, pressing away 
regional and local differentiation. This, argue her biographers Rooke and Schnell, 
Whitton was actually able to do, as “a uniformity of standards and transformation 
of practices can be discerned at a national level.”3 
It was that collection of goals that guided the Council’s endeavors in New 
Brunswick. To Charlotte Whitton and her colleagues, the inconsistent responses 
to cases of vulnerable children like Tom were simply axiomatic reflections of a 
disorganized, inconsistent, inefficient, and problematic child welfare system in 
the province. Despite the existence of a new provincial Children’s Protection Act 
(1927), its operation was largely fictive in most regions of the province, leaving 
many children in need of extrafamilial care falling back upon customary poor law 
mechanisms and the random roll of chance in shaping which, if any, safety net 
might catch them.4 Not only did the Council seek to erase the uneven and random 
treatment of children within New Brunswick, but also to bring the province in 
line with national standards, techniques, and apparata of a coherent child welfare 
system. Ultimately, Whitton and the Council sought to deliver a perceived 
Canadian standard of modern childhood in New Brunswick through modernized 
state mechanisms: a revised Children’s Protection Act and the appointment of a 
Superintendent of Child Welfare.
In order to elicit support for such new-fashioned reforms, the Council 
conducted a social welfare survey of the province’s children, carried out in large 
measure by New-Brunswick-born social worker Elizabeth King, and issued 
a public report based on the survey’s findings.5 Throughout the course of the 
survey investigation, the Council concurrently attempted to restaff child-housing 
3 Patricia Rooke and R. L. Schnell, “‘Making the Way More Comfortable’: Charlotte Whitton’s Child 
Welfare Career, 1920-1948,” Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (Winter 1982-83), pp. 33-34; and 
Patricia Rooke and R. L. Schnell, “Child Welfare in Canada, 1920-1948,” Social Service Review, vol. 55, 
no. 3 (September 1981), p. 490-491, 495. 
4 New Brunswick, The Revised Statues of New Brunswick, 1927 (Fredericton, 1927), chap. 63. The 
literature on New Brunswick’s persistent use of the poor law includes Judith Fingard, “The Relief of the 
Unemployed Poor in Saint John, Halifax, and St. John’s, 1815-1860,” Acadiensis, vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 
1975), pp. 32-53; Brereton Greenhous, “Paupers and Poorhouses: The Development of Poor Relief in Early 
New Brunswick,” Histoire sociale / Social History, vol. 1, no. 1 (April 1968), pp.103-126; ; and James 
M. Whalen, “Social Welfare in New Brunswick, 1784-1900,” Acadiensis, vol. 2 no. 1 (Autumn 1972), 
pp. 54-64. New Brunswick had created an Adoption Act in 1873, suggesting familial-based options were 
potentially possible. See Veronica Strong-Boag, Finding Families, Finding Ourselves: English Canada 
Encounters Adoption from the Nineteenth Century to the 1990s (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 25-26 and 32.
5 Elizabeth King received an AB and an AM from Acadia University in 1905 and 1907 respectively, took 
an American Red Cross summer course in social work in 1918, and a course in the behavioural problems 
of children at the New School for Social Research in 1928. She moved from a secretarial position at 
the Ottawa Welfare Bureau, advanced to become an investigator for the Ontario Mother’s Allowance 
Commission, and then became senior investigator for the commission. She moved from Ottawa to New 
York City where she was a visitor for the Family Welfare Society of Queens and the Brooklyn Bureau of 
Charities. It was likely there she received an intensive apprenticeship in modern social work or case work 
practice. The timing of her summer course at the New School suggests King moved directly from New 
York to New Brunswick. See Library and Archives of Canada (hereafter LAC), Canadian Council on 
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institutions and child welfare agencies, replacing the largely volunteer and 
informally trained local welfare labour force with professionally trained social 
workers. In the published survey report and throughout its campaign in New 
Brunswick, the Council did not restrict itself to statements on the condition of the 
province’s children, but instead advocated for changes to provincial legislation, 
especially to the Children’s Protection Act.6
Such efforts to standardize child welfare practice within New Brunswick 
and to bring the province in line with emerging Canadian norms were exercises 
in state formation. When state forms were sufficiently mature, they came to 
define and regulate a larger collection of people, what Marx called the “illusory 
community.” This community was, of course, the nation: the “imagined political 
community,” as Benedict Anderson called it, or the “fictive community in which 
we are all citizens,” as Phillip Corrigan and Derek Sayer have put it. The nation, 
the latter argue, was in many ways a territory of the mind with no essential 
form; it was a device, a collection of ideas that the state defined and regulated, 
typically reflecting the interests of the bourgeoisie.7 To assert those definitions 
and regulations, to make a nation, was to engage in what the Canadian historian 
Frank Underhill some seventy years ago called the “‘moral struggle’ over the 
fundamental principles on which society should be based.”8 Almost two decades 
ago, Ian McKay similarly posited that “‘Canada’ should … denote a historically 
specific project of rule” (characterized as liberalism) wherein those moral struggles 
were (and are) dynamic and alive. Furthermore, McKay encouraged historians 
to “study those at the core of this project who articulated its values, and those 
‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ who resisted and, to some extent at least, reshaped it.” He 
invited historians to “imagine a way of doing history that locates the ‘problem 
of Canada’ within the history of power relations.”9 The New Brunswick Child 
Welfare Survey can be located within this intellectual agenda, as can the more 
particular events surrounding the Boys’ Industrial Home, in which Poorhouse 
Tommy played a part. The survey was a highly politicized process concerning the 
presentation of moral values about modern childhood, part of the process of state 
formation where the state sought to extend national standards concerning child 
welfare and to deny particularity, including provincial deviation from the emerging 
norms. As Stein Rokkan has argued, in “the conflict between the central nation-
building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or 
Social Development (hereafter CCSD), MG 28 I 10, Vol. 25, file 118 – 1928, “Statement of Experience - 
Elizabeth King.” 
6 For the CCWH’s use of social surveys, see, for instance, Ken Moffatt, A Poetics of Social Work: Personal 
Agency and Social Transformation in Canada, 1920-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 
chap. 5. 
7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991), pp. 6 and 67; and Phillip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State 
Formation as Cultural Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 4-5 and 191-196. 
8 First published in 1946, see Frank Underhill, “Some Reflections on the Liberal Tradition in Canada,” in 
Ramsay Cook et al., eds., Approaches to Canadian History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 
p. 29. 
9 Ian McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History,” 
Canadian Historical Review, vol. 81, no. 3 (September 2000), pp. 620-622.
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religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries ... the 
fundamental issue was one of morals, of the control of community norms.” This 
struggle, he continues, showed itself in, among other things, “the organization 
of charities,” including charitable organizations and institutions directed at child 
and family welfare.10 To understand the contest between the state, as embodied in 
this study by the Canadian Council on Child Welfare,11 and New Brunswickers in 
this process of state-formation, to attend to the language, politics, and strategies 
employed in that project is, as Joy Parr has more generally suggested, “a way to 
understand how power works.”12
I seek to provide a case study of liberal state formation in action, paying 
particular attention to the historical actors, children among them, who advanced 
agendas, to those who resisted or sought to reshape them, and the context that 
enveloped them. This essay proceeds by examining generally the ways in which the 
Council addressed the “problem” of New Brunswick’s child welfare institutions 
in both the survey and the resultant report and then turns its attention to a more 
detailed examination of the Council’s engagement with the Boys’ Industrial 
Home as a particular project of liberal state formation. As part of the survey 
investigation, Whitton, King, and others examined the condition of children’s 
institutions in New Brunswick. What they found seldom met the standards of 
intervention, comfort, and care they held up to be acceptable and in keeping with 
modern national standards. Nowhere was this more the case than at the Boy’s 
Industrial Home, the major male juvenile detention centre in the province, and 
home to Poorhouse Tommy. Like other institutions, the Industrial Home was the 
subject of investigation by the Council, but at a particularly serendipitous moment 
in the Home’s history. The boys there were in revolt against the conditions in 
the institution and the consequences of the legal and policy provisions that put 
them there. The subject of a second investigation organized by Whitton but carried 
out by Harry Atkinson, Chairman of the Delinquency Section of the Council, the 
10 Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties (New York: David McKay, 1970), as cited in Seymour Martin 
Lipsett, “The Revolt Against Modernity,” Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 254. Emphasis in the original.
11 As a nongovernmental organization, we would more conventionally understand the Council to be formally 
part of civil society—that collection of buffers in between the family and the state. Yet, in significant 
ways the Council donned the robes of state. There had been a proposal for a single government body 
that handled both health and welfare concerns, similar to the U.S. Children’s Bureau, but the Canadian 
government opted to take only health under its formal mantle, establishing the Child Welfare Division 
within the Department of Health in 1920. However, the government actively promoted the formation of 
the Council, which it envisioned would take up all nonmedical issues related to child welfare, and offered 
sizeable yearly grants to the Council. And from 1934 to 1938, the Council served as the Maternal and Child 
Welfare Division within the Department of Health. Moreover, as the legal historian Margaret McCallum 
has suggested, the Council (and other non-governmental agencies) regularly used the apparata of state to 
assert themselves, and here Whitton’s focus on revising laws linked the Council firmly to the orbit of the 
state. See Margaret McCallum, “Canadian Legal History in the Late 1990s: A Field in Search of Fences?” 
Acadiensis, vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring 1998), p. 158. For the founding of the CCCW, see R. L. Schnell, “‘A 
Children’s Bureau for Canada’: The Origins of the Canadian Council on Child Welfare, 1913-1921,” in 
A. Moscovitch and J. Albert, eds., The ‘Benevolent’ State: The Growth of Welfare in Canada (Toronto: 
Garamond Press, 1987) pp. 95-110. 
12 Joy Parr, “Gender History and Historical Practice,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 76, no. 3 (September 
1995), p. 365.
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Industrial Home was one of the few child-centred institutions to actually undergo 
extensive reform as a result of the Council’s efforts in New Brunswick, and, 
indeed, as a result of the children’s own activism. It was there, owing to matches 
lit by Poorhouse Tommy and his rebellious young comrades, that the project 
of modernizing the child welfare system found the most success in 1920s New 
Brunswick, and where we can count among the influential actors some children, 
who are less often seen as political agents of meaningful consequence in the 
project of liberal state formation.13
Appeasing New Brunswick’s Child Welfare Institutions
The social survey became the Council’s most common tactic for spreading its 
influence throughout Canada. Over time, provincial, sometimes municipal, surveys 
of child welfare typically resulted in highly publicized and often scandalous 
“survey reports” that indicted existent child and family welfare services and 
institutions and, ultimately, social welfare legislation. The Council’s favored 
legislative target was the Children’s Protection Act, the mechanism that defined the 
nature and delivery of child welfare services in a given province. A survey report 
would then recommend a series of institutional and statutory reforms, including 
suggested text for revisions to the Children’s Protection Act. Whitton was anxious 
to standardize Children’s Protection Acts across Canada and to use them to move 
dependent children away from institutional care toward family-based foster care. 
In support of that agenda, the Council created or reorganized Children’s Aid 
Societies, Family Welfare Bureaus, and Community Chests, putting in place the 
scientific principles of modern social work, specifically the casework approach. 
Part of this process consisted of ridding the agencies of volunteer and untrained 
staff, and so the survey activity usually contained a sharp critique of the skills 
and training of those who occupied managerial positions within agencies. Having 
convinced board members and officials that such uncredentialed staff needed to 
be replaced by professional staff, the Council secured its position by arranging for 
those replacements.14 
The Council exercised that approach in its 1927 survey of New Brunswick, 
which was the first significant social welfare survey conducted by the Council and 
established the methodology and tactics it would use for surveys to come. According 
to the New Brunswick survey Report, some 900 children lived in institutions. 
The Boys’ Industrial Home, almshouses and municipal homes, Children’s Aid 
Society shelters, various Roman Catholic boarding schools, academies, refuges, 
reformatories, and orphanages: each was a home for some number of children. 
13 On the necessity of approaching the issue of children’s agency with careful thought, see Mona Gleason, 
“Avoiding the Agency Trap: Caveats for Historians of Children, Youth and Education,” History of 
Education, vol. 45, no. 4 (2016), pp. 446-459. 
14 See Rooke and Schnell, “Child Welfare in English Canada,” pp. 493-500; Rooke and Schnell, “Making 
the Way,” p. 36. On the professionalization of social work in Canada, see, for instance, Sara Burke, 
“‘Science and Sentiment’: Social Service and Gender at the University of Toronto, 1888-1910,” Journal 
of the Canadian Historical Association, vol. 4 (1993), pp. 75-93; James Struthers, No Fault of Their Own: 
Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914-41 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); 
and Gale Wills, A Marriage of Convenience: Business and Social Work in Toronto, 1918-1957 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995).
7Whitton and King’s key criticism concerning these institutions was only partly 
about the role of chance in randomly directing those 900 children to various 
institutions, but also about the presence of that many children in institutions at all. 
“As repeatedly pointed out in the Survey,” they wrote:
institutional care is practically the only solution offered in New Brunswick today for 
the child requiring care and protection. The institutions have not been able to build 
up their own admission and demission services, and in the absence of a Provincial 
Superintendent [of Child Protection] and the consequent slight development of 
children’s aid services, these facilities have not been otherwise provided.15
Their criticism here was directed against the failure to adopt fostering and out-
placement arrangements in lieu of institutional care. “It is the opinion of this 
Survey,” wrote Whitton and King, “that the counties of New Brunswick, through 
the creation of Children’s Aid Societies ... and the co-operation of public and 
private philanthropy, can provide finer, fuller, safer, and richer opportunities for 
normal childhood and wholesome growth for all the little children of the Province 
who must be removed from their own homes.”16 The two were convinced that 
an organized children’s aid apparatus, under the direction of a Superintendent of 
Child Welfare appointed under a revised Children’s Protection Act, promised to 
rescue children from the problematic world of institutional care. 
While Whitton and King decried the placement of children in institutions, 
they nevertheless concluded that such common practice in New Brunswick meant 
that institutions required careful attention. The physical plant, the personnel, and 
the programming of each institution therefore fell under their sharp scrutiny. In the 
published survey Report, Whitton and King crafted a general section criticizing 
the institutional care of children, which drew heavily from an earlier report 
concerning British Columbia, authored by Robert Mills, Director of Toronto’s 
Children’s Aid Society. Additionally, they presented a section that reported on 
each institution, or collection of them in the case of almshouses.
The published criticisms of the institutions were in keeping with concerns and 
trends of the times. By the 1920s, institutionalization was thought undesirable; 
indeed, that belief had long been in circulation. But the gathering of different 
“types” in the same institution was a matter of even greater concern as the 
environmentalist interpretation of child behavior advanced. Lack of segregation—
from adults, the physically or mentally ill, and the incorrigible or “feeble-minded,” 
as then termed—threatened to construct an environment in which a relatively 
“normal” child was placed in danger of contracting any number of undesirable 
characteristics or behaviours, they argued.17 Thus, in the general section on 
15 Canadian Council on Child Welfare (hereafter CCCW), Report of the New Brunswick Child Welfare 
Survey, 1928-29 (hereafter Report of the Survey) (Saint John: Kiwanis Club, 1929), p. 181.
16 CCCW, Report of the Survey, p. 149.
17 See Renee Lafferty, The Guardianship of Best Interests: Institutional Care for the Children of the Poor in 
Halifax, 1850-1960 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2013), chap. 3; Patricia T. Rooke and R. 
L. Schnell, Discarding the Asylum: From Child Rescue to the Welfare State in English-Canada, 1800-1950 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), part II; and Neil Sutherland, Children in English-
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almshouses, Whitton and King lamented that “the children share the life of the 
adults, aged, and infirm, who are in the almshouse, eating in the same rooms 
and sharing the same sleeping and toilet accommodation.... Children and infants 
were found all in the same home, separated only by the one broad classification 
of sex.”18 
In keeping with the emerging twentieth-century environmentalists’ emphases, 
an institution’s physical plant and its programming were thought to foster the 
development and improvement of the child’s present condition and its future. 
Here, for instance, Providence St. Joseph at Shediac was taken to task for its 
“inadequacy in the bathroom facilities” and in fire fighting apparatuses. And 
although the Wiggins Orphanage was praised for its physical assets—it overlooked 
a lake suited for skating, had finely appointed grand rooms, and personnel could 
relocate to a farm from spring until autumn—in its programming, the institution 
was found inadequate. The boys were held in care until age 17 and neither readied 
for nor encouraged to return to family members before that time. The survey 
described the orphanage as “self-contained.” While the boys received education, 
participated in leisure activities, and worked on the farm—the key principles of 
good programming at that time—that they did so entirely in each others’ company, 
isolated from the larger community, was considered problematic.19
Most institutions received a jab or poke in the published survey report, but 
these were often softened nudges. The portrayals of many institutions had been 
adapted and rearranged as the survey went through the review process. Among 
others, municipal officials associated with almshouses, the Board of Governors 
of the Wiggins Orphan’s Home, the Secretary of the Protestant Orphan’s Home, 
and most especially the leaderships associated with the Saint John Children’s 
Aid Society and the Boys’ Industrial Home resisted the original reports on their 
institutions. In the early drafts, Whitton and King were direct and assertive in 
their criticisms of the institutions, particularly around issues of programming 
and physical environments. But as the process leading to the publication of the 
Report proceeded, Whitton recognized the political danger that would arise 
should she encounter resistance from the leadership of New Brunswick’s child 
welfare institutions. If Whitton was to win support for the appointment of a 
Superintendent of Child Welfare and a revamped Children’s Protection Act, she 
needed the support of institutional leaders, who were often politically well-placed 
and powerful. While Whitton circulated the early drafts of the institutional reports 
to board members and officials, she noted that she considered them “entirely 
preliminary” and was willing to make any revisions that could be made without 
compromising the Council’s principles.20 This, she stated, she saw as a matter of 
Canadian Society: Framing the Twentieth-Century Consensus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1978), chap. 7. 
18 CCCW, Report of the Survey, p. 148.
19 CCCW, Report of the Survey, pp. 171-173.
20 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – 1928-29, Whitton to Brittain and Simpson, February 23, 1929. 
The report on the Saint John Children’s Aid Society remained sharply critical in the published version.
9“diplomatic importance.”21 Whitton’s calculated strategy serves to remind us that, 
on a more immediate scale, the project of liberal state formation involved not only 
the presentation of values and the creation of state and non-state forms to advance 
those, but also interpersonal negotiations by historical actors who weighed and 
measured the more effective ways to advance their agendas.
The decision to accommodate wide review and what amounted to approval-
seeking for the institutional reports produced numerous results. For Whitton, the 
results included a constant stream of diplomatic wrangling she needed to finesse, 
but also frustration as, for instance, the section on the Saint John CAS was 
rewritten for at least a third time.22 The result for King was frustration too, as the 
process leading to the survey’s publication slowed down, as tempers in Saint John 
flared, and as her time on the New Brunswick assignment stretched on.23 The result 
for local institutional leadership was fear, as prominent individuals now viewed 
themselves at risk of public embarrassment and condemnation. Among them were 
A. M. Belding, publisher of the Saint John Telegraph and President of the Saint 
John CAS, and the Venerable Archdeacon H. A. Cody, best-selling author of some 
25 boys’ adventure novels and Chairman of the Wiggins Orphanage Board.24 
Another result of this review process, perhaps the most politically suave one, 
was the emergence of what can be termed a series of shadow reports. As Whitton 
and King revised and recast institutional reports, softening the sharp edges of 
their criticism in order to advance their agenda, they retained the condemnatory 
sections of the original institutional reports. These “confidential” or “private” 
reports are only referenced in the published survey Report and did not become 
part of the public record, but they are retained intact in the unpublished historical 
record.25 
Of these various shadow reports, arguably the most important concerns the 
Boys’ Industrial Home. The Boys’ Industrial Home was opened as a reformatory 
institution for juvenile males in 1893.26 Located in East Saint John, the Home 
occupied property leased from the federal government. The outbuildings included 
a granite farm building, which had been the Saint John Penitentiary for adult 
offenders, and several smaller agricultural buildings. A three-story brick building 
housed the main living quarters, which included a classroom, several dormitories, 
21 For an exchange between Whitton and the Wiggins Orphanage on this issue, see LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, 
Vol. 37, file 167 – 1928-1929 and 1929, H. A. Cody to Whitton, March 22, 1929; Whitton to Cody, March 
23, 1929; Cody to Whitton, April 3, 1929; and Whitton to Cody, April 16, 1929.
22 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, vol. 37, file 167 – 1928-29, Whitton to Mills, March 18, 1929.
23 By this time, King had left New Brunswick in order to complete another project but had returned again to 
facilitate the final publication of the survey. See LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – 1928-29 and 
1929, Simpson to Whitton, February 28, 1929; Whitton to Simpson, March 5, 1929 and March 11, 1929.
24 See Ted Jones, All the Days of His Life: A Biography of Archdeacon H. A. Cody (Saint John: New 
Brunswick Museum, 1981). See also Gerald Baily, “The Venerable Archdeacon H. A. Cody, A Man of God 
and Letters,” unpublished paper, 1945, University of New Brunswick Archives.
25 These reports are held in LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – Institutions, 1929.
26 The Home is also referred to as the Boys’ Industrial School; indeed, the two terms are used interchangeably 
in the records. I have adopted the use of the term Home, reflecting the title used in the annual reports of the 
institution.
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a dining room, kitchens, a library, and some workrooms for both the boys and the 
staff. A punishment cell and cold-water washroom were located in the basement.27
The Industrial Home existed under a provincial act of operation, so the 
financial foundations of the Home were largely public in nature. Municipalities 
were required to pay $200 towards the maintenance of each boy it sent to the Home 
but were empowered to recover those costs from parents, if possible. Any money 
gathered from the sale of farm products or woodwork, animal stock, or berry-
boxes that the boys crafted was added to the maintenance fund, and the province 
contributed the balance. In this regard, the Home was relatively unique in that few 
of the province’s child welfare institutions drew directly from the provincial public 
purse.28 And municipalities used this financial arrangement to their advantage, 
“shov[ing] off their neglected children and even simple dependency cases into 
the delinquency institutions,” Whitton reported to the framer of the 1908 Juvenile 
Delinquents Act. “In that way,” she concluded, “they get the Province to pay half, 
whereas the dependent child must be carried entirely by the municipality.”29
It was that direct connection to the provincial level of government that helped 
to facilitate not one but two shadow reports on the Industrial Home. Whitton and 
King authored the first. Then, after a series of violent events at the Home, the 
premier and attorney general of the day, J. B. M. Baxter, commissioned the second 
study. Baxter tasked Harry Atkinson, Chairman of the Delinquency Section of 
the Council, to conduct the second upon Whitton’s recommendation. While the 
reports are interesting for what they tell us about institutional life in interwar New 
Brunswick, they also reflect the broader workings of the child welfare system in 
New Brunswick. Significantly, the reports convey a rich sense of what happened 
to some youngsters amidst the inconsistent response that was the child welfare 
“system” in the province.  
The reports are significant in another way too. In discussions of state formation, 
normalization and moral regulation, children seldom appear as agents of their 
own lives or as actors on the stage of historical change. Rather, they have often 
appeared as passive, depoliticized victims, who opened their bodies to medical 
inspectors, arrived at school where they were shaped and moulded, or were 
regulated by laws that cast them as deviant or problematic. In this regard, they 
appeared as the easy objects of liberal state formation. While their families may 
have resisted such impositions and manipulated the welfare machinery in order 
to protect their children or themselves, less often have we seen children doing so, 
particularly children who were institutionalized.30 Admittedly, and very happily so, 
27 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – Institutions, 1929, CCCW, “Confidential Report on the Saint 
John Boys Industrial Home” (hereafter “Confidential Report”), p. 4. 
28 In the late 1920s, expenses averaged $20,000 annually, of which $9,500 was paid by municipalities, and 
$2,000 was earned from the sale of the institution’s products. The province contributed the remaining 
$8,500. CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 1; and CCCW, Report of the Survey, p. 174.
29 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – Child Welfare in New Brunswick 1928-29, Whitton to W. L. 
Scott, March 15, 1929.
30 Xiaobei Chen Tending the Gardens of Citizenship: Child Saving in Toronto, 1880s-1920s (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 80; Franca Iacovetta, “Parents, Daughters, and Family Court 
Intrusions into Working-Class Family Life,” in Franca Iacovetta and Wendy Mitchinson, eds., On the 
Case: Explorations in Social History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), p. 313; Sara Posen, 
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there are now important exceptions to that criticism. Canadian historical studies 
have presented children as active agents and instigators, capable of managing and 
manipulating their history.31 It is by concentrating on the activism of children that 
we might place them in their rightful position in history. And the rightful position 
of children in history is, in good measure, within the history of power relations. 
Subject to tremendous and multifaceted state intervention and definition, the 
boys of the Saint John Industrial Home were not simply passive recipients of 
a historical package delivered to them. Instead, they were active participants in 
what they helped to make into a transitional moment in their institution’s history, 
and thus active agents in the process of state formation.
Boys’ Home Conditions and Children’s Activism 
Soon after his arrival at the Boys’ Industrial Home in 1926, Poorhouse Tommy 
developed a reputation as a troublemaker; later, he developed a skill for setting 
fires.32 It was his and other boys’ fire-setting that came to symbolize a revolutionary 
moment in the history of the Saint John Industrial Home; for in 1929, the boys there 
were engaged in revolt.33 In mid-March, threats of violence toward staff members 
surfaced after the night guard, whose very appointment Whitton had advocated 
in her shadow report, was assigned to the upper sleeping quarters. On March 21, 
some boys burned the piggery building to the ground. The instigator was later 
identified as a boy whom the superintendent himself referred to as Evil Genius.34 
The following night, the 17-years-old Evil Genius put into action a coordinated 
effort to set fire to the main building from five separate points simultaneously. 
Poorhouse Tommy set one of the five fires, all of which were extinguished.35 In 
early April, at the instigation of another boy, Tommy set fire to the hayloft, which 
threatened the main barn. That fire was also extinguished.36 A later plan to bomb 
the buildings with dynamite was uncovered by the administration of the Home 
“Examining Policy from the ‘Bottom up’: The Relationship between Parents, Children and Managers at the 
Toronto Boys’ Home, 1859-1920,” in Lori Chambers and Edgar-Andre Montigny, eds., Family Matters: 
Papers in Post-Confederation Canadian Family History (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 1998), 
pp. 4-9; and Joan Sangster, Regulating Girls and Women: Sexuality, Family, and the Law in Ontario, 1920-
1960 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 145, and 157-159.
31 Bettina Bradbury, “Gender at Work at Home: Family Decisions, the Labour Market, and Girls’ Contributions 
to the Family Economy,” in Bettina Bradbury, ed., Canadian Family History: Selected Readings (Toronto: 
Copp Clark Pitman, 1992), pp. 177-198; John Bullen, “Hidden Workers: Child Labour and the Family 
Economy in Late Nineteenth Century Urban Ontario,” Labour/Le Travail, vol. 18 (Fall, 1986), pp. 163-
187; Robert McIntosh, “The Boys in the Nova Scotian Coal Mines: 1873 to 1923,” Acadiensis, vol. 16, 
no. 2 (Spring, 1982), pp. 35-50; and Joy Parr, Labouring Children: British Immigrant Apprentices to 
Canada, 1869-1924 (Toronto: UT Press, 1994). 
32 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – Institutions 1929, Harry Atkinson, “Report Re. The Boys 
Industrial School Province of New Brunswick” (hereafter “Atkinson Report”), p. 18.
33 For a discussion of children’s resistance, see Stephen Humphries, Hooligans or Rebels: An Oral History of 
Working-Class Childhood and Youth 1889-1939 (Oxford: Wiley, 1981). See also Tamara Myers and Joan 
Sangster, “Retorts, Runaways and Riots: Patterns of Resistance in Canadian Reform Schools for Girls, 
1930-60,” Journal of Social History, vol. 34, no. 3 (2001), pp. 669-697. 
34 “Evil Genius is the pseudonym given for case no. 483, but he is actually referred to as “evil genius” by both 
Parker and Atkinson. PANB, NBBIS, RS 460-A-1-B, 1929, BIS, History Book, 1929, case no. 483, p. 120. 
35 BIS, History Book, 1929, case no. 483, p. 120.
36 BIS, History Book, 1929, case no. 454, p. 87.
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before it was acted out.37 The institution’s annual report for 1929 also hinted 
that there was an unusually high number of attempted escapes during the year.38 
Two friends were especially persistent in their escape attempts. On February 12, 
one boy escaped but was located and returned. The next night, he and his friend 
escaped from the third floor, climbing down a rope fashioned from blankets and 
sheets. In the course of the escape attempt, one injured his back, the other his foot. 
Retrieved but still handcuffed, the first boy managed to locate a tack hammer and 
break free, only to be apprehended again. A week and a half later, the second boy 
made his escape while attending Sunday School. Spotted in Campbellton some 
time later, he was finally apprehended in Moncton, returned to the Home, and 
placed in a detention room “fitted up” especially for him.39
According to the annual report of the Superintendent of the Industrial Home, 
A. J. Parker, the older boys had formed an “organized opposition” under the 
leadership of the Evil Genius. That boy rallied the support of two teenage boys 
who had been acting as monitors for the administration. This nexus of illicit power 
was located in the upper dormitory, where the younger boys had been “coerced 
into silence.” Echoing the contemporary concern about gangs—organized, illicit, 
powerful groups of boys prone to property destruction, vandalism, and theft40—
Parker blamed this group for the threats of violence, the fires, and for encouraging 
escapes. But while the Evil Genius may have been the mastermind, Parker 
acknowledged that it was not he who actually set the fires. The annual report 
does not explain why the young man was so incensed against the school. The 
only statement Parker made that offers us any clue is that the Evil Genius had 
suggested to others the more trouble he made, the more immediate his removal 
from the institution.41 But there is certainly more to this story than one vengeful 
boy with the charisma or power to have others do his bidding.
The boys’ revolt occurred against a backdrop of heightened anxiety about 
youth. Health, education, family life: each of these represented an area of concern 
and attention as Canadians attempted to mould their postwar generation. But 
in the 1920s, obstreperous children who appeared to plug their ears and stomp 
their feet in opposition to the regulatory reach of the state became the subject of 
intense scrutiny and interest. These were juvenile delinquents, in the terminology 
of the day, and they were Canadians’ anxieties made manifest. Unpredictable, 
threatening, resistant, intractable, unstable: these were not the traits of youth 
thought worthy of celebration. In the 1920s, such anxieties were compounded 
37 BIS, History Book, 1929, case no. 483, p. 120.
38 BIS, Report of the Superintendent of the Boys Industrial Home of the Province of New Brunswick Located 
at East Saint John, N. B. for the Year 1929 (hereafter Annual Report, 1929), (New Brunswick, 1930), 
pp. 7, 9.
39 PANB, NBBIS, RS 460-A-4, 1929, BIS, Daily Journals of the Superintendent.
40 On the growth in concern about gangs, see, for instance, Michael Boudreau, “Crime and Society in a City 
of Order: Halifax, 1918-1935,” (PhD diss., Queen’s University, 1996), pp. 314-319; and Joan Sangster, 
Girl Trouble: Female Delinquency in English Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), pp. 25-26 and 
31-33. On particular concern around vandalism and theft, see Rebecca Coulter, “‘Not to Punish but to 
Reform’: Juvenile Delinquency and the Children’s Protection Act in Alberta, 1909-1929,” in Rooke and 
Schnell, Studies in Childhood History, p. 177.
41 BIS, Annual Report, 1929, pp. 9-10. 
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by a growing sense of social instability as the adult generations worried aloud 
about fundamental changes in social values, morals, and behaviours. W. L. Scott, 
a key framer of the Juvenile Delinquent’s Act, highlighted such concerns when 
he wrote: 
the breaking-down of traditional codes of conduct and morality is symptomatic of 
the general crumbling in a rapid industrial-urbanization, of the whole behaviour 
code. The amazing thing about the numbers of children, or of adolescents rather, 
out of adjustment with our long accepted standards of conduct and morality, is not 
their apparent increase, but that that increase is not greater than it is, at a time when 
society itself is apparently in a transition stage. To what standards shall youth adjust 
itself, when even the rocks of time seem slipping in sands beneath our feet?42 
According to Michael Boudreau’s study of one Maritime city, this anxiety produced 
something of a panic as Haligonians fretted over the growing juvenile crime wave 
and the eruption of rampant hooliganism and gangsterism.43 Such crime waves 
may have been mythical,44 but such hand-wringing over an imaginary one does 
remind us of the search for stability and security many Canadians sought and of 
the sense of dislocation in the period after the war.
Whether they broke laws or not, children who thumbed their noses at authority 
in any multitude of ways found themselves confronted by agents and authorities 
of the state designed to correct, reform, and readjust them. In law, such attention to 
juvenile offenders was not new in the 1920s. The Youthful Offenders Act of 1894 
was the first federal legislation designed to address problematic youth exclusively, 
though the issue of juvenile offenders had been addressed in colonial law as early 
as 1857. The Criminal Code of 1892 included youth, and the legislation of various 
provinces addressed children through devices such as Industrial Schools Acts.45 
But the Juvenile Delinquent’s Act (JDA) of 1908 signaled the modernization of 
Canada’s approach to problematic youth. In essence, the JDA adopted the thesis 
of the environmentalists. Juvenile delinquents were made, not born the argument 
went. If offenders’ contexts were adjusted and their behaviors revised, then such 
children could be set on the path to good citizenship. Reclamation, not punishment, 
was the task at hand.46 But New Brunswick had not adopted the provisions of the 
42 W. L. Scott, The Juvenile Court in Action (Ottawa: The Canadian Council on Child Welfare, 1927), p. 33.
43 Michael Boudreau, City of Order: Crime and Society in Halifax, 1918-35 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), 
pp. 121-122.
44 D. Owen Carrigan has suggested that after the turn of the twentieth century in Canada, juvenile crime 
became more common and the seriousness of those crimes increased. In light of this, conviction rates 
increased as did police patrols, but Carrigan maintains this was a response to the fact children were more 
dangerous. Susan Houston suggests there is little sense in comparing rates of juvenile crime or delinquency 
over time, because understandings of what constituted juvenile delinquency changed so markedly over 
time and in context. D. Owen Carrigan, Crime and Punishment: A History (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1991), p. 219; and Houston, “The Waifs and Strays,” pp. 131-132.
45 For discussions of these laws, see Carrigan, Crime and Punishment, pp. 414-415; Houston, “The ‘Waifs and 
Strays,’” p. 132; and Leonard Rutman, “J. J. Kelso and the Development of Child Welfare,” Moscovitch 
and Albert, eds., The “Benevolent” State, pp. 69-72.
46 On the readjustment of juvenile offenders, see Dorothy Chunn, From Punishment to Doing Good: Family 
Courts and Socialized Justice in Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); and Jacques 
Donzelot, The Policing of Families (New York: Pantheon, 1979). On the influence of environmentalism, 
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JDA anywhere in the province. Ultimately, this failure would be pointed to as the 
root cause of the boys’ revolt.
Even before the fires, The Boys’ Industrial Home had received harsh criticism 
in the Council’s shadow report.47 The section of the review that Whitton held 
back from publication was entitled “The Home Plant,” and it comprised four 
typewritten pages of indictment. More than a mere description of the buildings 
and their state of disrepair, this section was a stinging commentary on the living 
conditions of the boys in the Home. 
Three themes emerged from the review: the lack of adequate physical 
facilities, the lack of adequate programming, and the threat of what was referred 
to as “moral danger,” a trilogy of themes crafted to position the institution and 
the boys in it as deficient and retrograde. According to the report, written mostly 
by King and reworked by Whitton, the three-story main building was “seriously 
overcrowded.” The classroom was likewise overcrowded, and the dormitory 
adjacent to it was “bleak and desolate looking.” The fact that the boys had to 
undress downstairs before going up to bed was a matter of concern to the Council. 
With 24 beds in what had been a classroom, there was no place in the room for 
the boys to store their clothing. The dining room, located on the main floor, was 
“bare and unattractive,” and although food was abundant, the survey crew thought 
it neither appetizing nor approached with proper etiquette. The washroom and 
locker room, which doubled as a playroom, was cold, serviced only with cold 
water, and lacked any of the recreational equipment that the Council thought 
ought to have been present in a playroom. The Home’s library housed over 300 
books, which the survey crew approved of, but there was no reading room in the 
institution.48 “The whole House,” wrote King and Whitton, “is disorderly, untidy, 
and not overly clean. The beds were in particularly poor state. The arrangements 
for clothing, for washing, for the observance of the essentials of munimum [sic] 
cleanliness and tidiness, did not seem to be definite.”49 
If the potential reformation of the boys was thwarted by the physical 
constraints of the Home, according to the Council it was similarly derailed by 
the lack of appropriate programming. Recreation was part of the program for 
producing healthy, well-adjusted children in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. And manly recreation was thought particularly important in developing 
the character of boys.50 Indeed, some thought that the values of sportsmanship 
and athletic discipline were a requisite part of the programme of juvenile reform. 
see Paul W. Bennett, “Taming ‘Bad Boys’ of the ‘Dangerous Class’: Child Rescue and Restraint at the 
Victoria Industrial School,” Histoire sociale / Social History, vol. 21, no. 41 (May 1988), p. 75. 
47 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – 1928-29, Whitton to J. Brittain, and Whitton to Simpson, 
February 23, 1929; Whitton to Simpson, March 11, 1929; and Simpson to Whitton, March 12, 1929.
48 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” pp. 4 and 5.
49 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 6. On the pattern of condemning the physical environment of institutions, 
see Matters, “The Boys’ Industrial School,” pp. 56 and 64-65; and Sutherland, Children in English-
Canadian Society, p. 139.
50 For a discussion of these roles of sport in Maritime history, see Colin Howell, Northern Sandlots: A Social 
History of Maritime Baseball (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), particularly chaps. 6 and 7. 
More generally, see Dominick Cavallo, Muscles and Morals: Organized Playgrounds and Urban Reform, 
1880-1920 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981).
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The Council noted the institution’s practice of outdoor sport but condemned the 
lack of indoor game equipment for use in wintertime and the lack of space to 
play. The institution had apparently abdicated the prescribed responsibility for 
the “stimulation of the boys to virile active interests,” and the report charged 
that “there seemed little constructive recreation, though it would likely be easy 
to obtain assistance in this, without any difficulty by calling on the community 
resources available.”51
While sport and recreation were perceived to be necessary to a boy’s 
reformation, so too was rigorous labour instruction. The provision of industrial 
training for the boys received mixed reviews. No sustained, professionally 
organized industrial training programme existed at the School, nor would it 
for some time. King and Whitton noted the domestic work of young boys in 
the kitchen and of younger and older boys in the construction of berry boxes 
and crates. But the equipment for their construction was lacking, they thought, 
as was the volume of work. Much-needed carpentry, painting, and repair work 
throughout the Home held the promise of useful activity, but there was too little 
of it in practice to provide any thorough training for the boys.52 The agricultural 
industry of the school did earn diluted praise from the survey. “There seemed to 
be considerable interest and instruction in the agricultural work of the Home, and 
things seemed more ‘ship shape’ in this department than elsewhere,” they noted 
unenthusiastically.53
In the end, the Industrial Home’s programming stood charged of failing to 
create sporting, industrious boys, and it also stood charged of failing to provide 
appropriate rehabilitative services and instruction in order to reform “delinquents.” 
Those charges ranged from the middle-class sanction against rough manners to 
the failure of the institution to grapple with its mission to reform the character 
of the boys. They went on to castigate the institution for not developing parole 
and probationary services.54 According to Whitton and King, if the purpose of the 
Home was to create reformed, modern youngsters, it had failed. The institution was 
little more than a grown-up prison for little boys who needed reform, not simply 
incarceration. In a clear embrace of the modern approach to child psychology, 
King and Whitton castigated the Home further for failing to develop a case study 
or psychological profile of each boy, which might be used to better direct his 
reformation:
The whole purpose of the commitment of the delinquent to the care of an Industrial 
Home is the substitution of training and development of his moral and material 
well-being, as opposed to straight penal incarceration. If this is to be successfully 
accomplished, the boy must be thoroughly studied, there must be a fairly complete 
picture of the situation and circumstances, which have sent him into clash with the 
community and brought him to the Court and institution. There must be individual 
study, the discovery and development of his interests, and inclinations; careful 
51 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 6.
52 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 5 and 6.
53 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” pp. 5-7.
54 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 6.
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judgment of his personality, and its hidden wells; and above all, the contact of a 
constructive and energizing personality, if the boy is to benefit by the period of 
time in which the community has withdrawn him from its ordinary life for this 
very purpose. The community’s job is not finished until the young offender is again 
safely established in the normal life of his own kind, in his own community group. 
This is the ideal which the Boys’ Home should strive to attain.55
 
While this might have been the modern ideal prescribed for the institution, 
clearly, in the opinion of Whitton and King, the Home had failed to achieve it. 
While alleging that the institution failed the tests concerning worthy physical 
plants and appropriate programming, most scandalous to King and Whitton was 
the placement of boys in perceived “moral danger.” That the upper dorm was 
distant from supervision was of great concern. On the second floor, another dorm 
accommodated 36 boys, and the Council again pointed with concern to the lack 
of night supervision. “The moral dangers of the dormitory arrangements,” the 
authors stated, “and the lack of night supervision, struck the Survey as presenting 
serious problems that did not seem to be fully realized.”56 Of the various solutions 
the Council proposed, the appointment of a night guard was the only one that was 
acted upon quickly.57
What other solutions did the Council propose in order to remedy the situation 
at the Industrial Home? They offered only four others. In keeping with the modern 
desire to “distinguish the lines of treatment” for different categories of children, 
the Council recommended the amendment of the Children’s Protection Act to 
restrict and supersede sections of the Boys’ Industrial Home Act so that the only 
boys placed in the Home would be delinquents, clearly charged and convicted as 
such before the courts. Neglected or abandoned children, like Poorhouse Tommy, 
would be dealt with through other mechanisms. Whitton provided model language 
for the amendments that received the support of the premier, J. B. M. Baxter 
who was also Attorney General and thus under whose purview the Home fell. 
Nevertheless, those recommendations were not acted upon for years to come.58 
The second recommendation suggested the establishment of a garage on the edge 
of the property, where the boys could learn both mechanics’ skills and business 
skills. Such a venture at a Quebec Boys’ School had proven successful.59 But the 
premier, who favoured the agricultural work of boys, rejected this suggestion, 
despite his acknowledgement that the Home’s lands were unfit for farming.60 
The third suggestion advised the out-placement of the older boys into the 
community. Experiments in Manitoba had proved that programme successful.61 
But any reasonable expectation that such a programme might be invoked in New 
Brunswick awaited a more coordinated and activist social service system. 
55 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 7.
56 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” pp. 4-5.
57 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – 1928-29, Baxter to Whitton, March 19, 1929.
58 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 3.
59 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 6.
60 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – 1928-29, Baxter to Whitton, March 19, 1929.
61 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” pp. 6-7.
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The fourth suggestion was decidedly more cryptic but entirely in keeping 
with the Council’s emerging approach to professionalization and the extension of 
its influence. “It is difficult to define the situation,” wrote King and Whitton, “but 
everything seems ‘let down’ in some way, on which one cannot put one’s finger.... 
Strong, vigorous control, energy ... seemed lacking.”62 Here, King and Whitton 
were echoing their earlier advice that “the contact of a constructive and energizing 
personality” was necessary to the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents.63 It would 
soon become clear that Whitton was lobbying for the dismissal of the Home’s 
superintendent, A. J. Parker, and his replacement by a professionalized, Council-
sympathetic administrator. The premier was not inclined to take Whitton’s advice 
on this particular issue, at least not immediately. While noting that his “objection 
to the place is radical,” Baxter went on to suggest “Parker is rather a good man, 
but under present conditions his wife is an unfortunate handicap.” He continued:
The trouble is largely Mrs. Parker. She had a stroke which has left her partly a 
cripple and entirely jealous. She meddles with the boys instead of mothering them. 
Her suspicion is carried to such a point that, when trying to see a boy alone, I have 
frequently had her enter the office unannounced and seat herself. She fears the boys 
says thing about her—and they do when they get a chance!
Instead of acting quickly to replace Parker, the premier advocated a slower 
approach. Only now was the Board of the Home aware of the problems at the 
institution, he suggested. And with this knowledge newly in hand, he thought the 
Board needed time to wrestle with the issues described in the shadow report.64
Acts of Protest, the Atkinson Report, and Liberal State Formation
Yet the boys of the Industrial Home were less patient. While undoubtedly unaware 
of the negotiations and discussions between the premier and Whitton, the boys 
inserted themselves into that political dialogue through their actions. Just two 
days after Baxter cautioned Whitton to be patient and avoid “radical action,” 
the boys set the first fire that destroyed a building and its stock. As the fires and 
plotting continued over the next few weeks, it became clear that patience was an 
imprudent approach. Baxter turned to Whitton for advice, while initially avoiding 
meeting with Parker, who sought to meet with him. Whitton recommended a 
second investigation that would be more thorough than the one associated with 
the Survey, but one that would maintain links to the Council and its agenda of 
professionalization and legislative change in New Brunswick. Harry Atkinson, 
Director of the Manitoba Industrial Home at Portage la Prairie and Chairman 
of the Delinquency Section of the Canadian Council on Child Welfare was 
recommended by Whitton and brought in by Baxter to author the second report. 
62 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 6.
63 CCCW, “Confidential Report,” p. 7.
64 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 37, file 167 – 1928-29, Baxter to Whitton, March 19, 1929.
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Atkinson’s report was more detailed and, in some ways, more damning than the 
Council’s.65
During his week-long visit to the Home, Atkinson encountered dirty children 
with untidy clothing. He found most of the boys in the basement, which was strewn 
with clothing and shoes. The washroom, also strewn with clothing, was filthy, and 
one of only two toilets in an institution of 60-some boys was out of order. The 
shower room, where boys bathed nine at a time, twice weekly, in cold water, was 
of equal disorder. The punishment cell adjacent to the shower room was “in an 
indescribable state of dirt and disorder.” The dorms were dirty and disheveled, 
and the beds in a condition that would have, reportedly, caused “repulsion at the 
thought of having to sleep there.” These conditions were not remedied during 
Atkinson’s week-long visit, nor were clearly dangerous conditions such as the 
electrical wires half-ripped from the walls repaired.66 Atkinson expanded on 
Whitton and King’s theme about the physical constraints of the building, adding 
gross disrepair to the list of indictments against the Industrial Home.
Atkinson went on to lend further ammunition to the survey crew’s concerns 
regarding table manners at the Home but expanded upon the condition of the food. 
The system of serving the food, he suggested, guaranteed only that it would be 
cold and tasteless. Indeed, several boys whom Atkinson interviewed remarked 
that they “had never had a hot dinner since they had been in the school.” But a 
more frequent complaint among the boys was that their daily porridge was wormy 
and maggoty. When they complained to the superintendent and refused to eat the 
porridge, he retaliated by refusing the boys butter and, at other times, by restricting 
them to a bread and water diet. Superintendent Parker admitted this to Atkinson 
when questioned by him.67
Atkinson was equally quick to condemn the lack of programming at the 
Home. While trying to teach the boys group games he found them uncooperative 
and quick to break rules to win. “This absence of group loyalty,” wrote Atkinson, 
“and of sustained interest both reveal the need of a constructive programme of 
activities which will teach the boys the principles of good sportsmanship and 
citizenship.”68
Among the most interesting aspects of Atkinson’s report are the notes he 
included on each of the 41 boys he interviewed, something approximating the case 
files or individual study Whitton and King had advocated for. It is in those notes 
that Atkinson meets the issue of the boys’ sexuality, what Whitton and King had 
termed moral danger, though he curiously makes no editorial comments about it 
in the report. In those records, an eight-year-old boy, admitted to the Home under 
the age prescribed by the JDA (age 12), stated that he had “seen boys doing wrong 
to their bodies.” A 13-year-old added that he thought the eight-year-old ought 
to be removed, convinced that “he’ll soon learn dirty stuff.”69 One 17-year-old, 
65 PANB, NBBIS, RS 460-A-4, BIS, Daily Journals of the Superintendent, March 25, 1929, March 30, 1929, 
and April 3, 1929.
66 “Atkinson Report,” pp. 1-2.
67 “Atkinson Report,” p. 3.
68 “Atkinson Report,” p. 3-4.
69 “Atkinson Report,” p. 10.
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whom Atkinson labelled “mentally defective” and in need of care at a different 
institution, was known to masturbate. Another 17-year-old, labeled “imbecile” and 
a “moral menace,” was known to masturbate in front of other boys, and a 16-year-
old, again labeled “imbecile,” was noted for indulging in “self abuse.”70 There are 
also cryptic comments that raise more questions than they answer. Among them 
is a boy who stated “they use me” and who Atkinson noted reported “wrong-
doing and a lot of hammering among boys and not enough care given to find out 
things.”71 Another boy reported that there was “no dirty stuff in bedrooms now,” 
presumably referring to the period after the appointment of the night guard.72 
There is no reason to expect the Saint John Home was exceptional in this regard. 
In his study, Frank Mort noted puberty signaled “a flashpoint for boys,” prompting 
multiple messages emphasizing self-control. In their study of a girls’ reformatory, 
Tamara Myers and Joan Sangster noted the existence of “love light” relationships 
among the girls, and in his study of juvenile delinquents, Stephen Humphries 
concluded “among teenagers mutual masturbation, sodomy and exhibitionist 
displays became important features of the dormitory subculture.” Similarly, Brian 
Coldrey has suggested “understandably, the young men, faced with exploding 
hormones ... resisted the unfamiliar and rationalized sexual mores of official 
rhetoric. There was a persistent sexual underworld in the institutions. The boys 
sought intimacy and pleasure.... A counter culture of sexual experimentation was 
a way of confronting and rejecting staff aspirations.”73 But however common such 
an institutional culture was, its public disclosure threatened great embarrassment 
to the premier, under whose purview the Home fell.
Some of Atkinson’s findings are clearly further kicks at the cans thrown into 
play by Whitton and King: the physical deficiencies of the Home, the inadequacy 
of programmes, and the sexual behaviour of adolescent boys. Indeed, in several 
instances he makes connections between his report and that of the survey. But 
Atkinson’s report is especially important in another way; through his interviews, 
he was able to uncover the mood of the boys at the Home and from this we can 
draw a more nuanced understanding of the circumstances that led the boys to 
rebellion. Indeed, we sometimes hear the voices of the boys themselves.
It appears from the interview notes that the instigation of protest by the 
17-year-old Evil Genius is, in fact, partially correct. But this interpretation by 
Superintendent Parker, that the resistance was the result of one individual, was 
but a partial understanding.74 What does stand out much more clearly in the case 
70 “Atkinson Report,” p. 12 and 15. 
71 “Atkinson Report,” p. 18.
72 “Atkinson Report,” p. 11. This discrepancy might be because the boy was in a different dorm from the 
others.
73 Barry Coldrey, “‘The Extreme End of a Spectrum of Violence’: Physical Abuse, Hegemony and Resistance 
in British Residential Care,” Children and Society, vol. 15 (2001) p. 104; Bryan Hogeveen, “Accounting 
for Violence at the Victoria Industrial School,” Histoire sociale / Social History, vol. 42, no. 83 (May 
2009), p. 148; Humphries, Hooligans or Rebels, p. 219; Frank Mort, Dangerous Sexualities: Medico-
Moral Politics in England Since 1830 (London: Routledge Keegan Paul, 1987), p. 193; and Myers and 
Sangster, “Retorts, Runaways and Riots,” p. 678. See also, Terrence Sullivan, Sexual Abuse and the Rights 
of Children: Reforming Canadian Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), pp. 25-27.
74 “Atkinson Report,” p. 14.
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notes is a general dissatisfaction widely spread among the boys, which caused 
them, apparently many of them, to embrace acts of resistance and protest. 
Clearly, escape was a widely practiced form of protest among the boys of the 
Industrial Home at Saint John. Significantly, escape was a far more common act 
than the annual reports of the institution suggest. Among the complaints of the 
boys inclined to escape, especially among the smaller boys, were the regular 
poundings or hammerings they received from the older boys. In the case notes of 
seven of the 41 boys he interviewed, Atkinson recorded the violence of older boys 
directed at younger ones. Of those seven, three reported that they had run away 
from the Home to avoid the beatings. Complaints about the institution and/or its 
administration, ranging from a general dislike of it to complaints about unjust 
treatment, appeared in 13 of the cases. Of those, four boys had run from the Home. 
But clearly, according to Atkinson’s case notes, the predominant issue for the boys 
was loneliness. Eighteen of the boys complained of loneliness and 11 reported they 
had fled the institution to seek remedy for their feelings.75 In Atkinson’s counting 
of the previous 103 cases at the Home, there had been 115 escapes among them.76 
While the fires might have been more dramatic, flight obviously formed the more 
typical method of rebellion. While fire was a visible, direct, and violent means 
of destroying the institution and its authority, successful escape also snapped the 
authority of the institution for the boy who got away and, arguably, for those who 
knew he had escaped successfully.77
Nevertheless, the boys brought other acts of rebellion and resistance to 
bear on the authority of the Home. Some stole from the dairy; others stole from 
the office. Some, having suffered the strap, smashed at things with hammers. 
Others, the Evil Genius among them, were convinced that by getting themselves 
in trouble, they would win an early release. Still others broke windows at the 
Home in an attempt to “annoy officers” or fashioned keys out of spoon handles, 
allowing them access to closed areas of the Home.78 These acts of petty sabotage 
and the common practice of flight alerted Atkinson to a deeper sense of injustice 
among the boys. As the director of an industrial home himself, Atkinson would 
have been accustomed to the average displays of loneliness and unhappiness and 
to the regular patterns of uppity behaviour from children. But in Saint John he 
found something more extreme and of greater concern. The lack of loyalty to the 
75 “Atkinson Report,” pp. 9-18. On loneliness as motivation to escape, see Myers and Sangster, “Retorts, 
Runaways and Riots,” pp. 679 and 681.
76 “Atkinson Report,” p. 7.
77 Myers and Sangster have noted that running or escape was the “most active form of resistance” employed 
at the girls’ home they studied. “Retorts, Runaways and Riots,” p. 678. See also Humphries, Hooligans or 
Rebels, p. 219-220, who notes “the most dramatic and secretive form of resistance within the dormitory 
subculture was the planning and execution of escape attempts.” Bennett, Taming Bad Boys,” pp. 91-92, 
has noted escapes occurred most frequently during times when the population of the institution was under 
pressure due to overcrowding or quarantine. “ Coldrey summarizes another series of events where boys 
used fire as a mode to express their discontent. Boys aboard ships serving as floating industrial schools 
attempted to burn the vessels. See references to the Akbar and Clarence during the late nineteenth century 
in Coldrey, “The Extreme End,” p. 102.
78 PANB, NBBIS, RS 460-A-1-B, BIS, History Books, 1929, p. 120; and “Atkinson Report,” pp. 9, 14-15, 
and 17. For similar forms of resistance, see Coldrey, “The Extreme End,” p. 98; Humphries, Hooligans or 
Rebels, p. 218; and Myers and Sangster, “Retorts, Runaways and Riots,” pp. 669, and 673-676.
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superintendent was deeply marked, as was the sense that he was unapproachable. 
Atkinson was aware that the superintendent was ill and was caring for his wife. 
But Atkinson was especially concerned that Superintendent Parker’s remoteness 
fuelled the loneliness of the boys. He likewise implied that the responsibility for 
the poor food, the “tyranny practised by the older boys upon the younger ones,” 
the “lack of segregation of types,” the lack of programming and the unsystematic 
system of release from the Home all rested with Parker.79 In fact, the irregularity 
of the release system and the harshness of the sentencing conventions in New 
Brunswick represented a flashpoint for the boys’ anger. “I ran away five times 
because I’m not getting a fair deal,” one boy reported. “Last time I came back I 
was in [the] cell eight days on bread and cold water.”80
The issue of a “fair deal” was one that Atkinson picked up on. Atkinson 
faulted the provincial state for the boys’ revolt. The federal Juvenile Delinquents 
Act of 1908 prescribed the modern treatment of juvenile offenders across Canada, 
but New Brunswick disregarded it in practice, and this, he argued, had shaped a 
context that rightly fuelled the boys’ anger. While the JDA effectively created new 
categories of delinquency—incorrigibility as a children’s crime, but not an adult’s, 
for instance—various studies have shown that, once in place, a state apparatus 
emerged that softened or cushioned the treatment of juvenile offenders. For 
instance, children were to be tried in juvenile courts and held in separate detention 
centres, away from adults. Additionally, probation officers working in concert 
with the courts would study the child and his or her circumstances and make 
recommendations to the court about the best mode of rehabilitation, potentially 
avoiding incarceration. Where such systems evolved, it seems the court itself was 
sometimes avoided altogether as systems of interrogation, warning, and child 
welfare work replaced the more punitive option.81 In this sense, argues Dorothy 
Chunn, the legal apparatus surrounding the young offender delivered them into 
a form of “socialized justice” where elements of civil society—children’s aid 
societies in particular—were tied to the justice system in an effort to reform 
and rehabilitate, rather than punish youngsters.82 Andrew Polsky has similarly 
suggested that the creation of juvenile courts in America was a social effort more 
than a judicial one, designed to “apply normalizing casework techniques,” to 
offenders and children considered “maladjusted.”83 Because a child defined as 
delinquent became subject to the juvenile court’s intervention, the philanthropic 
and more voluntary approach of child welfare intervention was overpowered, in 
79 “Atkinson Report,” p. 4-5.
80 “Atkinson Report,” p. 16.
81 Revisions to the Act in 1929 reinforced the notion that delinquency was a condition, not an act; Carrigan, 
Crime and Punishment, p. 420. See Andrew Polsky, The Rise of the Therapeutic State (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 67 for quotation, and pp. 66-68. 
82 Chunn, From Punishment. On the role of police and the exercise of discretionary power in this process, 
see David Wolcott, “‘The Cop Will Get You’: The Police and Discretionary Juvenile Justice, 1890-1940,” 
Journal of Social History, vol. 35, no. 2 (Winter, 2001), pp. 349-371. On the role of parents and their 
discretionary use of the courts and state apparatus, see Tamara Myers, “The Voluntary Delinquent: Parents, 
Daughters, and the Montreal Juvenile Delinquents’ Court in 1918,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 80, 
no. 2 (June 1999), pp. 242-268.
83 Polsky, The Therapeutic State, pp. 65-66.
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a sense, by the welfare intervention of the state through its judicial system. The 
framer of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, W. L. Scott, put it this way: 
In other words, the Juvenile Court brought a new purpose to court procedure, not 
the purpose primarily of ascertaining whether the individual before the Court was 
or was not guilty of a specific offence, and the protection of society from that 
individual, but the sympathetic exploration of the causes bringing the individual 
before it with the predominating purpose of protecting that individual.... Implicit 
in that statement is the conception of juvenile delinquency not as an offence, but 
as a state of maladjustment,—the maladjustment of young life to the habits and 
to the standards of morality, chastity, truth and general conduct of its kind, their 
institutions, conventions, and community. For it is part of the very principle and 
concept of the Juvenile Court, that delinquency is a condition in which the child 
finds himself through the force of circumstances.... The Juvenile Court, then, is the 
State’s behaviour conference. It is essentially an expression of the state’s parenthood, 
when the natural parenthood of the child has failed, through circumstances within 
or beyond control, to furnish and render effective, behaviour codes for the child’s 
guidance and control.84
The chief difficulty was that New Brunswick had not amended its provincial 
legislation to align with the federal legislation, nor were any juvenile courts 
established in the province under the legislation. Thus, there was no vehicle 
through which the Act would be administered.85 By the 1920s, New Brunswick 
was unique in this regard. While often limited to urban centres, all other provinces 
had implemented the JDA somewhere in its parts.86 This failure to fall in line 
with the federal legislation had very concrete results in New Brunswick; for 
instance, children’s cases were held in open court and children were sometimes 
imprisoned with adult offenders, received little if any rehabilitative intervention, 
were incarcerated under the age of 12, and tended to be awarded relatively harsh 
sentences. These practices clearly contravened the expectations of those who 
advocated specialized treatment and facilities for juvenile offenders and common 
national standards.87
84 Scott, The Juvenile Court in Action, pp. 32-33.
85 On the disjuncture between the federal Juvenile Delinquent’s Act, 1908, and New Brunswick practice, 
see CCCW, Report of the Survey, pp. 115-123 and 124-129. There were also difficulties with the federal 
Act itself. While “crime” was within federal jurisdiction, “civil status” was within provincial jurisdiction. 
The federal legislation could not, therefore, “define delinquency as a state or condition” as most American 
legislation had done. Instead, delinquency had to be defined as a crime unto itself. Yet another difficulty 
was that the constituting of courts fell under provincial jurisdiction, thereby leaving the federal legislation 
with no ability to order the establishment of juvenile courts. From W. L. Scott’s “The Juvenile Court in 
Law,” in CCCW, Report of Survey, p. 116.
86 Carrigan, Crime and Punishment, p. 417. Michael Boudreau has argued that even when Saint John did 
establish a juvenile court and enable the JDA in the locale, the court punished almost all youngsters who 
came before it. Boudreau, “Crime and Society,” p. 307.
87 CCCW, Report of the Survey, p. 115. On the growing sentiment that separate institutions ought to be 
provided for juvenile offenders, see Carrigan, Crime and Punishment, pp. 405-412; Leonard Rutman, “J. J. 
Kelso and the Development of Child Welfare,” in Moscovitch and Albert, The “Benevolent” State, p. 74; 
and for Nova Scotia, see Boudreau, “Crime and Society,” pp. 326-328.
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While the Juvenile Delinquent’s Act had little authority in New Brunswick, 
the Prisons and Reformatories Act did. According to that legislation, a boy under 
16, convicted of an offence that would place an adult in prison for three or more 
months, could be put in an Industrial Home for a period of time to be decided at the 
court’s discretion. The sentence could not be longer than that which an adult would 
have received, but, significantly, the court did have the right to add on to the fixed 
sentence an indefinite term not to exceed five years in combined total. Likewise, 
boys sentenced to an adult prison could have received the addended indefinite 
term at an Industrial Home. The legislation also allowed for the apprenticing-out 
of boys from the Home if parents had given their consent, and the apprenticeship 
agreement could be extended beyond the five years, again with parental consent.88 
So it was in that loose legal fashion that boys were sent to the Industrial Home 
for crimes as simple as the theft of two bags of potatoes, or the theft of a carton of 
cigarettes, or truancy. And in the great bulk of cases, the charge was minor theft, 
it was the boy’s first encounter with the courts, and the sentence applied was the 
maximum and discretionary five-year term.89
The legal arrangements surrounding the Boys’ Industrial Home in Saint John 
fell under both federal and provincial jurisdiction (the Prisons and Reformatories 
Act and the Home’s Act of Incorporation, respectively), but it appears that the 
Home was actually governed in great measure by convention. Indeed, the Home 
was established before any children’s protection legislation was enacted in the 
province, and it early on evolved the custom of taking in boys who had not been 
committed by the courts. Despite its mandate to serve as a reformatory institution, 
the Home also accepted those in need of nonpenal, custodial care. This included 
disreputable or simply unfortunate boys who had not been before the courts. 
Similarly, given the absence or inadequacy of child housing institutions in parts of 
New Brunswick, it quickly became the practice to place neglected and dependent 
boys in the Industrial Home. A significant portion of the Home’s average 
population of 60 or so boys was thus comprised of boys who had not committed 
an illegal offence, but simply of boys whose parents had mistreated or misused 
them, or boys who appeared to be hungry or wanting for clothes or attention, such 
as Poorhouse Tommy.90 By the 1920s, the treatment of “delinquent, dependent 
and neglected children, as interchangeable groups” was, to the emerging modern 
social work profession, a deplorable thing and clearly out-of-step with modern 
national standards.91 But in the 1920s in New Brunswick, indeed in some of the 
88 CCCW, Report of the Survey, pp. 175-176.
89 Charges ranged from being neglected, begging and vagrancy, and using obscene language on the street 
to trespass at and tampering with CNR property, multiple kinds of theft, assault, indecent assault, auto 
theft and the killing of animals. BIS, History Book, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928 and 
1929. Following wider patterns across Canada, theft was the most common major offence. For instance, in 
Canada in 1925 and 1926, charges of theft against juvenile delinquents ranged over 3000. Charges in the 
next highest category—willful property damage—ranged between 500 and 600. Canada Yearbook, 1927-
1928, p. 1008, Tab. 34.
90 CCCW, Report of the Survey, p. 174-175. In the late nineteenth century, children were frequently placed in 
detention centres for what were matters of child welfare. Carrigan, Crime and Punishment, p. 214.
91 CCCW, Report of the Survey, p. 175.
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province’s institutions as late as 1949, children were often grouped together and 
grouped with adults.92  
The boys argued that the system had denied them just treatment or a “fair 
deal,” and Atkinson agreed. In his study of the last 103 cases admitted to the Home, 
76 of the boys had been assigned the maximum sentence of five years. “The effect 
of this long sentence upon the mind of the boy,” wrote Atkinson, “is to give him a 
sense of injustice and to fill him with despair.” That despair, he argued, so shook 
the confidence of the boys in the “justice of the law” that it created a defiance that 
would certainly result in resistance and rebellion. Atkinson argued that roughly 
60% of those sentenced to the full five years were first-time “offenders” and 
that presented a “terrible indictment against the courts of the Province of New 
Brunswick, and shows the need of the adoption of newer and more progressive 
methods of dealing with the problems of child neglect and juvenile delinquency 
in this province.”93 According to Atkinson, this harsh sentencing was the source 
of the boys’ sense of injustice. And, he continued, they were right to feel unjustly 
done by because New Brunswick practice ignored the provisions of the JDA, 
which restricted admittance to the Industrial Home to those over 12, unless other 
methods of treatment had failed. In New Brunswick, 30% to 40% of the boys 
in the Home would not have been there had the age provisions of the JDA been 
followed. Yet, even more alarming to the new generation of child-experts, roughly 
half of the last 103 cases to come to the Home were in fact not criminals, but 
simply neglected boys who more properly belonged under the jurisdiction of the 
Children’s Aid Society and, ideally, in foster placement.94 
In Atkinson’s interpretation, in this lay the cause for the boys’ revolts. It was 
not surprising, he argued, to find:
serious unrest among the boys and a defiance of law and order which can be traced 
to this sense of injustice due in turn to the long sentences often for trivial and 
first offenses. Any boy with real spirit will revolt when suffering from a sense of 
injustice. In these cases revolt was usually expressed by running away. The cost of 
these escapes to the school in time, phones, travel, etc., the cost to the province in 
police duty, etc., are large, but they are not to be compared to the incalculable loss 
to the school in discipline and esprit de corps, and to the boys in this brooding sense 
of injustice and defiance to constituted authority.95
His investigation, Atkinson concluded, had proved the Industrial Home at Saint 
John “to be a school of vice, rather than of reformation. These conditions have 
generated a spirit of revenge and revolt among the boys to such an extent that they 
are aroused against law and order. This has resulted in escapes, in the defiance of 
discipline, and in serious attempts to burn down or blow up the buildings.”96 
92 Patricia Rooke and R. L. Schnell, “Guttersnipes and Charity Children: 19th Century Child Rescue in the 
Atlantic Provinces, “ Patricia Rooke and R. L. Schnell, eds., Studies in Childhood History: A Canadian 
Perspective (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises, 1982), p.85.
93 “Atkinson Report,” p. 7, emphasis in the original.
94 “Atkinson Report,” pp. 6 and 8-9.
95 “Atkinson Report,” p. 8.
96 “Atkinson Report,” p. 5.
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Mandigo’s Insurmountable Challenge
Among his 11 recommendations, Atkinson called for the immediate replacement of 
Superintendent Parker, who had tendered his resignation after the boys’ revolt and 
in the course of Atkinson’s investigation. He also called on the Board of Governors 
to leave the new superintendent autonomous decision-making powers free from 
their interference, and for the appointment of an assistant to the superintendent. 
The Home property, Atkinson recommended, ought to be abandoned in favour of 
a rural farm where the boys could live in a cottage system, and “provision should 
be made for them to play.” Not surprisingly, he suggested that New Brunswick 
fall in line behind the Juvenile Delinquents Act. But perhaps more surprisingly, 
he advised the disbanding of the Board and the absorption of the Home under the 
Department of Education.97
In some ways, Atkinson’s report had written large the story of Poorhouse 
Tommy’s life. Indeed, Tom serves as a nearly perfect example of Atkinson’s 
indictment of child welfare legality in New Brunswick. Tom could read a bit 
and write some. By the time of his committal to the Home he had gained simple 
math skills and a grade-three education. He was described as a bright boy whose 
physical condition was only fair, perhaps due in part to his liking for cigarette 
smoking and tobacco chewing. He had been arrested once before for stealing 
$1.00, but there is no indication he had served time for that arrest. Then, at the age 
of 11, Poorhouse Tommy was sentenced in a Miramichi courtroom for “being a 
neglected child under the Children’s Protection Act.” For his simple vulnerability 
and a year underage, Tom was sentenced to an “indeterminate period not to exceed 
five years.” Under Whitton’s proposed revamping of the Children’s Protection 
Act, such a child would have been sent to a Children’s Aid Society, which would 
have placed him in foster care. Barring that ideal, he would have been placed in 
an orphanage.
Tom escaped the Industrial Home four times, returning voluntarily once, and 
was forcibly returned after being apprehended the other three. He was whipped on 
a dozen occasions in 1928 and on 21 occasions during 1929, the year of rebellion. 
In the months leading up to and through the fires, taking January to April inclusive, 
Tom received seven sets of punishment, mostly on the hands, sometimes on the 
bottom, predominantly for internal theft and behaviors such as squabbling, lying, 
and disobedience. On one of those occasions he was whipped in the company of 
Evil Genius for breaking a light and lying. Such practices of corporal punishment 
were in no sense unique to the Saint John Home. For instance, Barry Coldrey’s 
studies of institutional care have led him to conclude that “abuse—‘sometimes on 
an industrial scale’—was endemic throughout traditional residential care.”98
97 “Atkinson Report,” pp. 21-24. 
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Evil Genius was delivered eight sets of punishments in 1928 and 14 sets in 
1929, five of them in the January to April period.99 Of the two, Evil Genius appears 
more likely to have belonged in the Home. He was admitted in October 1927 for 
the five-year sentence on the vague charge of “incorrigible and vicious conduct” 
placed by relatives and the authorities. He was a good reader and writer with a 
grade-five education and a physical impairment that likely limited his mobility. 
He had not, for instance, escaped, despite his recurring incitement of others to 
escape.
The home life of Evil Genius appears to have been slightly more stable than 
that of Poorhouse Tommy’s. The Genius’s father, an American, had been dead 
eight years at the time of his committal. It appears his mother moved the family 
back to New Brunswick after her husband’s death, but she died a few years later. 
Evil Genius’s aunt took guardianship of him. She found the boy “kept bad hours 
[and w]ould not be controlled.”100 It appears Parker would have agreed with her. 
“This boy,” he wrote, “with evil genius, proved to be the leader in all opposition 
to rules, law, or order.”101 And some might argue, and perhaps rightly so, that the 
fact that Evil Genius would not be controlled and was able to elicit action from 
other boys allowed the Council’s modernizing agenda to stake new ground in New 
Brunswick and advance the path of welfare state formation. The fires demanded 
the second report, and the second report demanded, and won, the replacement of 
Superintendent Parker and subsequent improvements to the institution.
The Board of Governors of the institution had recommended the removal 
of the Evil Genius to Dorchester Penitentiary, but Baxter personally intervened 
to avert that move. Parker reported that “throughout the balance of his detention 
here,... [Evil Genius] maintained a bold attitude of hostility; a boast of retaliation, 
incited many boys to escape, and left the Home more or less in an uproar.”102 In the 
fall of 1929, before Parker’s exit, Evil Genius was expelled from the institution 
rather than moved to Dorchester. “So unhappy a boy we seldom meet,” concluded 
Parker, “so determinedly bad!”103 The Boys’ Industrial Home records on Evil 
Genius end with that very phrase. 
Neither Evil Genius nor Poorhouse Tommy would see much of the change that 
ensued with the appointment of the new Superintendent, Howard Mandigo. After 
the premier accepted Parker’s resignation, Whitton again lobbied the premier for 
an appointee that reflected the goals of the Council: professionalization, modern 
shared standards, and Council-sympathetic. While the premier had earlier been 
resistant to some of Whitton’s advice, on this issue and in the context of the 
rebellion at the Industrial Home, he was receptive.104 As a former senior worker 
at the well-regarded Shawbridge Industrial Home and former General Secretary 
1929. Mandigo, who would replace Parker as Superintendent, discontinued the practice of keeping the 
whip lists.
99 PANB, NBBIS, RS 460-A-4, BIS, Daily Journals of the Superintendent, 1928 and 1929.
100 PANB, NBBIS, RS 460 A-1-B, BIS, History Book, 1929, p. 120.
101 BIS, History Book, 1929, p. 120.
102 BIS, History Book, 1929, p. 120.
103 BIS, History Book, 1929, p. 120.
104 LAC, CCSD, MG 28 I 10, Vol. 38, file 167 - 1930 Vol. II, Whitton to Baxter, January 13, 1930.
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of the YMCA, Mandigo promised to be a skilled and successful replacement for 
Parker.105 But Mandigo’s task was to serve as more than a simple replacement. It 
fell to him to introduce the modern treatment of juvenile delinquents to a province 
that, in 1930, had adopted neither the structures nor infrastructures to make that a 
simple task.106 
“The people and the boys are just wonderful,” Mandigo reported back to 
Whitton, “but of course the buildings ... are impossible. Everyone I meet I talk 
‘change’ to.... Of course I’m for action.... I think it will come.”107 In April 1930, 
Mandigo was still an optimistic man. The physical plant of the reformatory was 
being subjected to a thorough scouring. Fresh paint, new plaster, replaced glass, 
and patched linoleum indicated a visible shift in the approach to the Home. So too 
did the new mattresses, 12 more of which needed to be added each month “for 
some time ... to bring [them] up to good shape.” Fashionable uniform sets, drinking 
bubbles, and the vast multitude of recently purchased shovels, rakes, pails, buck 
saws and wheelbarrows constituted but a mere fraction of the supplies used in 
the physical reformation of the institution. Two hundred brand-new shirts and 
mounds of new mittens, caps, ties, and socks filled the recently remodeled locker 
room, complete with numbered towel racks, a numbered tooth brush cabinet and 
wash basins filled with a novelty for the boys, hot water.108 And significantly, 
Mandigo reported, after his six-and-one-half weeks in charge of the reformatory, 
no boys had escaped or even attempted it.109 
Mandigo’s initial optimism and professionalised approach to juvenile 
reformation changed more than the physicality of the institution. Following the 
progressive belief that scouting, drill, and training built character, manliness, and 
work-ready discipline, he implemented and rejuvenated the Home’s scouting and 
cadet corps.110 Mandigo also revitalized the attention to baseball, playing on the 
team himself in matches against other boys’ teams from the city. But it was his 
individual study of each boy that pointed most clearly to the arrival of the modern 
treatment of juvenile delinquents in New Brunswick.111
These were signs of great progress to those worried individuals who had lent 
their attention to the situation at the Home over the previous few months. And it 
was the children of that Industrial Home who were, in good measure, responsible 
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for the changes that were sweeping their daily lives.112 Yet, despite the matchstick 
activism of those boys and despite Mandigo’s efforts to modernize the Home, in 
fundamental ways, little had changed. The legal apparatus was unaltered, and as a 
result the “delinquent” still coexisted with children who were placed in the Home 
because few other options existed, or because municipalities viewed the practice 
as an economically expedient way to address child welfare challenges.
The arrival of the Great Depression only exacerbated such problems within 
the Home. Maritimers were used to economic dislocation in the 1920s, but the 
essential suspension of traditional coping methods—particularly out-migration—
in the 1930s had important ramifications within the Home. Mandigo soon found 
that boys were being sentenced to the Home in such great numbers that the 
ever-overcrowded facilities could not bear-up under the pressure. Boys were 
being released with little treatment and were soon finding their way back to the 
institution. It is in that context that the story of Poorhouse Tommy continues. It is 
suggestive of another chapter in the history of the Boy’s Home in its illustration 
of the role of the dispossessed in turning institutions to their own advantage.113
It was the summer of 1931, about a year and a half into the new superintendent’s 
mandate, when Tom was released from the Industrial Home. His term had expired; 
indeed, he had spent five years and eight days in the reformatory. “[He] went 
to look for work,” Mandigo recorded, and “did not return.” As his sentence had 
expired, he was allowed to go “on his own.” Mandigo visited the boy’s uncle a 
month later and things seemed to be going well. But Poorhouse Tommy suffered 
the dislocation of the Depression of the 1930s, as did many other young Canadian 
men, and he had the added burden of having spent time under incarceration.114 
Tom appeared to be riding the rails and stopped at the Industrial Home for three 
nights stay in January 1932 on his way to Moncton.115 It is quite clear that three 
years later, a then 20-years-old Tom was still circled by dislocation. In March 
1935, he and another former Industrial Home inmate were arrested and charged 
in Fredericton. They had arrived from Saint John intending to transfer to Federal 
Relief Project No. 123 at Fredericton, but the pair were arrested for vagrancy after 
stealing clothes from the relief depot at the city’s exhibition grounds. By the time 
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the case found its way to court, the two faced the more serious charge of theft, 
and Poorhouse Tommy then confessed to stealing a bicycle the previous year. His 
childhood home the poorhouse, his adolescent shelter the Industrial Home, he was 
sentenced to spend at least two of his adult years in Dorchester Penitentiary.116 
Howard Mandigo offers us no further history of Tom.
By 1934, Mandigo’s grip on optimism had grown infirm. “The present 
location will never meet the needs of our institution. Segregation of types and 
ages is impossible in our present quarters,” he argued. He went on to decry 
the underdevelopment of an industrial program, the lack of cooperation from 
officials within the justice system, the lack of fertile land at the East Saint John 
site and general problems with sentencing that persisted since Parker’s days 
in the superintendency.117 Mandigo represented the Council’s, and indeed the 
government’s, hope. His appointment was designed to deliver modern standards in 
New Brunswick, aligning the province with the national state’s agenda regarding 
the treatment of juvenile delinquents and child welfare more generally. But that 
hope was thwarted by a continually problematic physical infrastructure and a legal 
structure stuck in stasis.
Conclusion
Clearly, the boys’ revolt did not produce the ideal treatment of juvenile delinquents 
in New Brunswick, nor did it solve the problem of simply neglected boys who 
found themselves placed in the Home. Nevertheless, the boys’ activism did serve 
to move that particular facet of Whitton’s wider child welfare reform agenda 
further than any of the other components of her agenda in New Brunswick. A 
series of historical events intersected to produce this event. The conditions of 
the Home were clearly rugged and likely to produce discontent. This, coupled 
with the infirmity and ineffectiveness of the superintendent, served to undercut the 
hegemonic authority of the institution. The emergence of homegrown leadership 
among the boys, likely neither evil nor ingenious, served to replace the formal 
authority of the institution with a nonformal authority, which appears to have been 
based in some measure on force and coercion. While the child-centred leadership 
produced the most violent forms of revolt, that leadership appears to have been 
so threatening that some of the boys sought to escape, not the institution and 
the authority of the Superintendent, but to escape the internal, child-centred 
leadership.118 The irony is clear. The last intersection of historical processes to affect 
this story is the attention that professionals directed at revamping New Brunswick 
childhood in the interwar period. The interventions of those professionals, namely 
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Whitton, King, and Atkinson, helped to deliver the children’s revolt to the realm 
of actual, if limited, institutional change.119
The Council had revealed the problems in child welfare institutions in New 
Brunswick and, in fragile and limited ways, was able to prompt changes to their 
administration and conditions. Such changes were charted most clearly at the 
Boys’ Industrial Home, helped along by the activism of the boys themselves 
and, undoubtedly, because of the Home’s bureaucratic relationship to the state. 
In the course of the Council’s campaign, Whitton was able to gain the support 
of some of New Brunswick’s citizenry who came to believe that she could put in 
place the personnel and the legal and bureaucratic apparatus that would make the 
province’s children and the province itself both “normal” and modern. Through 
a variety of scientific, moral, bureaucratic, and legal vocabularies, Whitton had 
defined the shared standards of nation to which New Brunswick could aspire. She 
had provided a blueprint within the survey report. This was part of the project of 
liberal state formation. Cynthia Comacchio reminds us that social welfare and 
public health professionals were certain that if the mental and moral well-being 
of youngsters was carefully shaped and moulded, then “the benefits in socio-
economic terms would more than offset any individual or state investment. The 
result,” she continues, “would be a modern Canada worthy of the most favourable 
implications of modernity: progress, efficiency, productivity, and the triumph 
of reason that was signified by advances in science and technology.”120 In short, 
through the regulation of childhood, Canada could cultivate a crop of liberal, 
modern citizens, thereby assuring the necessary human capacity to recreate and 
sustain a twentieth-century nation. In New Brunswick, that project was incomplete. 
The random and often illogical interventions that directed similarly unfortunate 
children to a camp, an orphanage, or a juvenile jail persisted after Whitton and 
King withdrew from the province in 1929. The daily predicaments of vulnerable 
children were little improved.
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